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ABSTRACT
Although ‘Seguro Popular’ (SP), a healthcare programme for the unin-
sured, has been in place in Mexico for more than a decade, its conse-
quences for international migration both to and from the country have
received little scholarly attention. Using the spatial variation in the
programme’s coverage generated through the rollout over time, this
paper examines the eﬀects of SP on the number of emigrants and return
migrants per household. Based on data from Mexico’s National Survey on
Demographic Dynamics for 1997–2014, the analysis conﬁrms that being
aﬃliated to SP does not reduce the number of emigrants per household,
but such aﬃliation is, however, positively related to the number of
returnees per household. These results are valid across diﬀerent subsam-
ples of the population and time periods and are robust to omitted
variable bias. Our ﬁndings have important implications for understand-
ing the eﬀects of social protection policies on international migration
patterns.
KEYWORDS
International migration;
return migration; healthcare;
SP; informality; Mexico
1. Introduction
For decades, only those Mexicans who worked in the formal sector and were, therefore,
aﬃliated to state social security institutions had access to public healthcare. For many uninsured
households in the country then, international outmigration had long been a tool of social
protection. Since 2004, however, the universal right to healthcare has been legally enshrined
in the Mexican Constitution. Although Mexicans are free to use private healthcare services, the
state is now responsible for providing access to public healthcare to all of its citizens. To fulﬁl
this obligation, the federal government implemented in 2001 the ‘Seguro Popular’ (SP) pro-
gramme, which provides access to public healthcare to the uninsured – including those who are
unemployed, self-employed or who work outside the formal sector. While in 2000 some 50% of
the Mexican population had been uninsured, by 2015 nearly 45% thereof were now aﬃliated to
this healthcare plan (INEGI, 2017). Interestingly, as the number of SP beneﬁciaries has
increased, the number of Mexican immigrants entering the USA has simultaneously steadily
dropped, and the volume of Mexican migrants now leaving the USA has also increased (Passel,
Cohn, & González Barrera, 2012). Yet, despite these developments, little is currently known
about the consequences of the expansion of healthcare access for the dynamics of international
migration decisions by Mexicans.
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In light of these changing circumstances, a key question is: to what extent does this social
programme inﬂuence the probability of Mexican households’ members emigrating from, as well
as returning to, the country? The answer is relevant to the on-going policy and scholarly debate
on international migration and development in migrant-sending countries.
Using data from Mexico’s National Survey on Demographic Dynamics (ENADID, in
Spanish) for the years 1997, 2006, 2009 and 2014, this paper shows that the programme’s
coverage has no eﬀect on the number of international emigrants per household – but it is,
however, positively related to the number of returnees therein. These results cast doubt on the
eﬀectiveness of universal healthcare programmes in curbing international outmigration in
developing countries like Mexico, where the quality of public healthcare is faltering, and
informality is pervasive. Yet, the evidence presented suggests that this type of programme
can encourage return migration, particularly when the beneﬁciaries lack access to healthcare
abroad because they are largely undocumented and/or participate in the informal sector of the
economy.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 oﬀers background information on international
migration patterns to and from Mexico and SP. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on the
relationship between international migration and access to public healthcare in Mexico. Section 4
lays out the data and methods used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the results obtained through
a series of linear regression models. Section 6 concludes by discussing the main ﬁndings and
suggesting new avenues of research.
2. Background information
2.1 International migration patterns in Mexico
Mexico has one of the largest emigrant populations in the world. Around 10.5% (12.2 million) of
the country’s citizens live abroad – of whom, 98% reside in the USA (BBVA Bancomer and
CONAPO, 2016). Unsurprisingly, Mexico is one of the world’s largest recipients of remittances
and the largest in Latin America (BBVA Bancomer and CONAPO, 2016). As of 2010, 1.3 million
Mexican households received monetary transfers from abroad (CONAPO, 2010; BBVA Bancomer
and CONAPO, 2016, p. 136). Since the turn of the last century, however, international migration
dynamics in the country have shifted. According to the 2010 Mexican Census, between 1995 and
2000, a total of 3 million Mexicans entered the USA; however, between 2005 and 2010, only 1.4
million Mexicans did so (Passel et al., 2012). Following the estimates of the Pew Research Centre,
between 2009 and 2014 only 870,000 Mexican nationals arrived in the USA (Barrera, 2015). As
immigration ﬂows from Mexico to the USA have fallen, the number of Mexican returnees heading
home has increased. According to the 2010 Mexican Census, a total of 1.4 million Mexicans
returned to the country between 2005 and 2010 – double the number of those who made the same
choice between 1995 and 2000. Between 2005 and 2014, meanwhile, nearly 2.5 million Mexicans
returned (Passel et al., 2012; Barrera, 2015). Presently, the number of Mexican returnees surpasses
that of their compatriots arriving in the USA.
The new dynamics of international migration in Mexico can be attributed to a variety of
factors, including: the economic recession that the USA underwent from 2007 to 2009; Mexico’s
steadily waning birth rates; the introduction of tougher immigration controls along the USA–
Mexico border; and the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies, such as the
unprecedented number of deportations that occurred during the two administrations of President
Barack Obama. However, the question of whether (and to what extent) the new patterns of
international migration in the country can be attributed to changes in state healthcare policies
remains unanswered. This is an important query if one of the purposes of Mexico’s government
policy is to improve the well-being of the population while also deterring international
emigration.
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2.2. The Seguro Popular programme
SP is a programme that provides healthcare access to households that have no members currently
registered with a Mexican social security institution. Its beneﬁciaries are households composed of
the unemployed, the underemployed or those working in the informal sector.1 The programme
covers the costs of a range of surgical procedures, medications and clinical tests related to 95% of
the country’s global burden of disease. Aﬃliation to SP is voluntary and not conditional on age,
health status or pre-existing illnesses. Since 2010, Mexican migrants living abroad have been able
to enrol themselves or their families in the programme, although health services must be provided
to Mexico, and not abroad. Obviously, return migrants can request aﬃliation with SP locally. All
beneﬁciary families of the programme who are not among the 40% of the poorest households
must pay an annual subsidiary fee.2
SP is a decentralised social programme. It is ﬁnanced by the federal government, but its funds
are managed by state authorities; healthcare services, meanwhile, are delivered by municipal
governments. The implementation of this programme was rolled out in stages across the country.
It was ﬁrst introduced in 2001 in the federal states of Aguascalientes, Campeche, Colima, Jalisco
and Tabasco, but by 2005, SP had become active in all 32 Mexican federal states. The number of
people enrolled in the programme jumped from 1 million in 2001 to 57 million in 2017 (INEGI,
2017). The range of beneﬁts oﬀered by this healthcare programme has also expanded: it covered
91 medical procedures in 2003 compared with 266 in 2012, for example (OECD, 2015).
Due to this state intervention in Mexico, medical consultations have increased, and both child
mortality rates and the incidence of contagious diseases have fallen (García Junco, 2015; Posma,
2014). In addition, total public health expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
increased from 2.6% in 2000 to 3.2% by 2013 (Frenk, Knaul, Gomez, & Gonzalez, 2012; OECD,
2015), while levels of inequality in the distribution of public funds between social security aﬃliates
and non-aﬃliates have signiﬁcantly declined over the years (Junco, 2015).3 Since the implementa-
tion of the programme, out-of-pocket expenses in healthcare and impoverishment rates due to
catastrophic healthcare expenditures have decreased in the country, by 55% and 24%, respectively
(OECD, 2015, 2016). Various academic studies corroborate these outcomes (Barofsky, 2011;
Barros, 2009; King, 2009; Sosa-Rubí, Salinas-Rodríguez, & Galárraga, 2011). Overall, SP has
succeeded in providing a safety net to beneﬁciary households, therefore, improving their capacity
to mitigate the impact of catastrophic health expenses.
3. Literature review
The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) is an approach that sees international migra-
tion as a strategy devised by households to compensate for a lack of access to capital or to
insurance markets (Stark, 1991; Stark & Bloom, 1985). Accordingly, families strategically send one
or more members to live in a labour market abroad that is not correlated with the one at home.
Through the ﬁnancial remittances that migrant family members send back, households subse-
quently overcome restricted access to labour, insurance or credit markets – thereby promoting
investment activities and unstaining consumption in times of diﬃculty. From this perspective,
migrants will only return once the capital and insurance needs of their household have been met.
Following the NELM, we would expect that the implementation of programmes for the
uninsured – such as SP – would both reduce outmigration from and increase return migration
to, sending countries. By reducing out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare by migrant house-
holds, SP should have a positive eﬀect on their disposable income. As the material well-being of
SP beneﬁciary households improves, they have fewer income risks – and therefore fewer incen-
tives to send members to live abroad. By extension, migrant members of SP beneﬁciary house-
holds have stronger incentives to return too, since household insurance needs are now covered by
the state.
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We, therefore, hypothesise that enrolment in SP discourages households from sending mem-
bers abroad and encourages household migrant members to return.
Previous research on Mexico conﬁrms that households lacking access to social security
institutions are more likely to send members abroad, and to use international remittances to
cover healthcare expenses at home. For example, using data from the Mexican Migration Project
(MMP), Amuedo-Dorantes, Sainz & Pozo (2007) ﬁnd that 46% of migrants surveyed who send
remittances back to Mexico do so to cover healthcare expenses. Based on data from the MMP,
Sana and Hu (2006) show that members of uninsured households in Mexico are more likely to
immigrate to the USA. Other accounts, based on Mexico’s National Survey of Household Income
and Expenditure (ENIGH, in Spanish), show that: i) remittance-recipient households spend a
larger share of their income on healthcare than non-remittance-recipient households do; and ii)
most remittance-recipient households in Mexico are uninsured (Airola, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes
& Pozo, 2011; Taylor & Mora, 2006; Valero-Gil & Treviño, 2010). Similarly, based on a survey of
Mexican migrant residents of Los Angeles, González-Block, De la Sierra De la Vega, and Vargas-
Bustamante (2013) show that 72% of those surveyed send remittances back home to be spent on
healthcare-related expenses.
However, other studies demonstrate that the impact of SP on a household’s tendency to receive
remittances or to spend them on healthcare-related expenses is weak, if not negligible. For
instance, based on a survey conducted in the most marginalised localities of Mexico, Escobar
Latapí and González de la Rocha (2012) show that aﬃliation to SP does not diminish the
probability of emigration by members of beneﬁciary households. Using data from the ENIGH,
Orraca-Romano (2015) reveals that a household’s aﬃliation to SP does not alter the probability of
it receiving remittances from abroad. Other studies corroborate that migrant households aﬃliated
to this healthcare still use international remittances to cover healthcare expenses (Valero-Gil,
2009; Ochoa Lupián & Ayvar Campos, 2015; González-Block et al., 2013, p. 461). Thus, previous
research suggests that SP has no eﬀect on a household’s income or decision to send members
abroad or not.
Nonetheless, the available evidence does indicate that the number of uninsured among return
migrants in Mexico has declined since the implementation of the programme. According to data
from the Mexican Census, between 2000 and 2010 the proportion of uninsured return migrants
dropped from 80% to 54% (Wassink, 2016, p. 848). As of 2005, 69.7% of Mexican returnees lacked
health insurance, 20.7% were beneﬁciaries of public social security, while 9.5% had private
insurance (Masferrer & Roberts, 2016, p. 246). By 2010, however, 39.6% of Mexican returned
migrants were aﬃliated to SP, according to the Mexican Census (Wassink, 2016). The degree to
which this universal health programme inﬂuences the migration patterns of Mexican households
thus warrants further investigation.
4. Research design
4.1. Data structure
To examine the impact of SP on the international migration patterns of Mexican uninsured
households, we use data from Mexico’s ENADID for the years 1997, 2006, 2009 and 2014. The
ENADID is a nationally representative survey, which compiles socio-economic and demographic
information on Mexican households – including the number of members who immigrated to the
USA over the past 5 years and of those who lived in the USA 5 years ago. The survey is conducted
by INEGI.4 To keep the sample homogeneous, the analysis is restricted to those households that
are eligible to enrol in SP – i.e. those with no members currently registered with any social
security institution. Out of all households participating in the ENADID survey, 45.5% are
uninsured and eligible for SP. This proportion has remained fairly constant since the programme
was implemented nationwide in 2006.
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SP coverage rates were computed using data from the National Commission on Healthcare
Social Protection (CNPSS, in Spanish) on the number of SP aﬃliates per federal state and per year.
We calculated the coverage rate by dividing the number of aﬃliates by the total number of
individuals eligible to enrol in the SP. Data on the number of eligible individuals were obtained
from the National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE, in Spanish). SP coverage rates
were computed speciﬁcally for the years 1997, 2006, 2009 and 2014.
Table 1 below provides summary information on the households included in the sample and
their heads across diﬀerent years.
4.2. Identiﬁcation strategy
As mentioned above, SP was rolled out over a period of 4 years across the diﬀerent municipalities
and federal states of the country. This means that the programme’s availability, coverage and,
therefore, the share of eligible individuals and households varies across time and space in Mexico.
A series of studies conclude that the introduction of SP was close to random (Bosch, Cobacho, &
Pagés, 2012). Given this, most quantitative studies on SP use exogenous variation in the avail-
ability and coverage rate of the programme to identify its causal eﬀects (Aterido, Hallward-
Driemeier, & Páges, 2010; Azuara & Marinescu, 2013; Bosch & Campos-Vásquez, 2014;
Grogger, Arnold, León, & Ome, 2015; Grogger et al., 2015; Orraca-Romano, 2015; Pfütze,
2015). In this study, we follow a strategy similar to the ones used by Grogger et al. (2015),
Orraca-Romano (2015) and Pfütze (2015). Thus, we estimate the following model using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS):
yhst ¼ γSPst þ Xhstβþ Zstλþ
X
t
δt þ
X
s
μs þ hst (1)
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: means overtime.
Variable 1997 2006 2009 2014
Individual-level
Male (%) 83.3 79.3 78.4 75.0
Age 43.5 45.3 44.8 46.2
Maximum educational level
Elementary education (%) 53.9 50.0 45.4 43.7
Secondary education (%) 15.0 19.4 23.3 26.5
High school education (%) 5.2 8.9 11.6 10.9
Undergraduate or graduate studies (%) 6.6 7.6 8.0 7.1
Married (%) 64.0 58.0 59.4 49.3
Employed (%) 83.3 74.9 79.3 76.7
Household-level
Aﬃliated to Seguro Popular (%) 0.0 21.3 45.6 75.3
Number of household residents 4.6 4.3 4.2 3.7
Number of international emigrants × 10 1.53 1.04 0.94 0.33
Number of international return migrants × 10 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.25
Remittance recipient (%) 3.2 4.3 4.1 3.6
Aﬃliated to Prospera (%) 0.0 29.1 28.1 33.6
Good-quality ﬂoor (%) 73.3 86.2 91.4 93.9
Drinking water (%) 77.4 82.5 84.1 88.7
Rural (%) 44.7 42.1 32.7 39.2
Highly urban (%) 27.3 27.5 34.8 27.1
State-level
Seguro Popular coverage rate (%) 0.0 30.2 52.7 86.4
Medical facilities per 10,000 inhabitants 1.87 2.10 2.30 2.39
Homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants 1.33 0.87 1.74 1.60
Observations (N) 34,634 17,197 33,187 40,814
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the ENADID, SIMBAD and Policía Federal (2015). SP coverage rate
calculated according to the number of households that are eligible to enrol in the programme.
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where when examining international migration, yhst is the number of members of household h in
state s in year t who emigrated to the USA over the past 5 years; when analysing international
return migration, yhst denotes the number of household members who lived in the USA 5 years
prior to being surveyed. SPst represents the SP coverage rate in state s in year t; Xhst is a vector
containing a battery of household-level variables that can inﬂuence the number of international
migrants per household; Zst is a vector of state-level variables; δt represents a series of temporal
variables that help control for time trends in the outcome variable; μs are state-level dummies that
capture state-speciﬁc characteristics that do not vary over the time but could inﬂuence the
availability or coverage of SP in a given state; and, hst is a random error term, which we assume
is uncorrelated with SPst , Xhst or Zst .
At the household level, the control variables in Equation (1) include: the number of household
residents, its aﬃliation to Prospera (a cash-transfer programme for the poor), indicators about the
quality of housing (such as the type of dwelling and access to running water), and whether the
household is located in a rural or urban area. Covariates related to the household’s head include:
age, birth cohort, gender, marital status, employment status and educational attainment level. At
the state level, covariates include: the number of medical facilities per 10,000 inhabitants, the
homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants, the political aﬃliation of the governor and state dummies.
State dummies are intended to account for the correlation of observations within states. State
governments oversee the management and distribution of the SP programme’s resources across
municipalities. Also, state characteristics such as the partisan aﬃliation of the governor or the level of
economic development can aﬀect the availability or coverage of SP at the state level. Standard errors
are clustered by state to account for possible correlation between households there.
5. Results
5.1 The exogeneity of SP’s expansion
This section examines the validity of the identiﬁcation strategy employed in the study. By using
the expansion of SP as a source of identiﬁcation, we assume that this variable is not correlated
with the outcomes of interest. Thus, we examine the exogeneity of SP expansion by testing
whether the programme’s coverage rates in 2006, 2009 and 2014 are eﬀectively predicted by the
pre-programme municipal- and state-level characteristics in 2000. Data for these variables were
obtained from Mexico’s 2000 Population Census.5
The test is, thereafter, performed by estimating the following model by OLS:
SPm ¼ XmαþWsθþ Ym  Zsð Þψ þ
X
s
μs þ εm (2)
where SPm is a continuous variable between zero and one that indicates SP’s coverage rate (or the
proportion of eligible individuals enrolled in the programme) in municipality m (or state s) in
2006, 2009 or 2014. Xm and Ws are vectors of municipal- and state-level characteristics in the year
2000; Ym  Zs is a vector of municipal- and state-level interaction terms and μs is state-level
dummies, both of which are introduced in the municipal-level analysis; εm is the error term.
The municipal-level covariates included in Equation (2) are the natural logarithm (log) of the
population, the share of urban population, the share of the male population, the average years of
schooling, the log of the average wage and income per worker, the share of the population under
24 years of age, the share of population between 24 and 40 years of age and the unemployment rate. At
the state level, we use the same controls alongside a series of state dummies and variables indicating
whether the governor is aﬃliated to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) or to the Partido de
la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Equation (2) includes variables at the municipal and state levels on
the average number of international emigrants and international return migrants per household, as
well as the share of households that receive international remittances.6
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As seen in Table 2, the expansion of SP at the municipal and state levels is not related to the average
number of international emigrants or return migrants per household, or to the share of them that
receive international remittances. Nevertheless, models in Tables S1 and S2 (Online Resource 1) show
that some variables are in fact related to the programme’s expansion. At the municipal level these are:
the log of the population in 2006 and 2009; the share of the population that resided in urban localities
in 2006, 2009 and 2014; the share of the populationwithout social security and the unemployment rate
in 2006; and a binary variable indicating whether the governor was aﬃliated to the PRI in 2006 and
2009 and the PRD in 2006 and 2014. At the state level, these variables include: the log of the population
in 2006, 2009 and 2014; the unemployment rate in 2006 and 2009; and whether the governor was
aﬃliated to the PRD in 2009 and 2014.
To corroborate whether the programme’s expansion was exogenous, for every control variable,
we ran separate regressions on the treatment (i.e. the SP coverage rate) including state eﬀects and
the control variable in question. This strategy is used to check the extent to which controls are
correlated and whether they neutralise each other when included in the regression models. As
seen in Table 3, the number of international emigrants per household and the share of remittance-
receiving households in a municipality are not related to the SP municipal coverage rate.7 We
could also see that, at the state level, none of the main variables of interest are related to the
programme’s expansion. Tables S3 and S4 (Online Resource 1) present the results obtained when
regressing all control variables. Overall, results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings on the programme’s
expansion having a faster expansion in smaller municipalities and states.
Of course, the implementation of SP was not entirely exogenous. However Table 2 provides no
evidence that the programme was targeted in speciﬁc municipalities or federal states in relation to the
outcomes of interest. These results thus support the identiﬁcation strategy used in the study. However,
since there was no randomisation in the implementation of SP, we cannot rule out the existence of
other potential threats to the identiﬁcation strategy used for assessing the programme’s eﬀects.
5.2 Main results
Table 4 presents the results for Equation (1). Column 1 reports the eﬀects of SP on the number of
international emigrants per household, whereas Column 2 details the impact of the programme
on the number of international return migrants therein.
Table 2. Determinants of Seguro Popular’s expansion by municipality and state. OLS regressions with a full set of control
variables.
Municipal-level State-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control variables 2006 2009 2014 2006 2009 2014
International emigrants per HH −0.011 0.005 0.002 0.028 −0.167 −0.180
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.331) (0.169) (0.104)
International return migrants per HH −0.090 −0.302 −0.719 7.783 0.494 −1.727
(0.208) (0.217) (0.564) (6.558) (3.779) (0.104)
Share of HH that receive remittances 0.087 −0.219 0.967 −28.111 −0.402 7.968
(0.421) (0.408) (1.197) (19.187) (11.773) (8.558)
Municipal-level controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal- and state-level interactions Yes Yes Yes No No No
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No No No
F-test 13.94 13.16 3.35 5.76 7.53 13.11
R-squared 0.223 0.213 0.065 0.534 0.727 0.794
Observations (N) 2,328 2,328 2,324 32 32 32
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Table presents regressions where the dependent variable is the proportion of eligible individuals covered by SP at the
municipal level (columns 1–3) and the state level (columns 4–6) in 2006, 2009 and 2014. Explanatory variables are drawn
from Mexico’s 2000 Census of Population and Housing. HH denotes household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Column 1 shows that the expansion of SP does not aﬀect the average number of international
emigrants per household. Although the estimated coeﬃcient is negative, it is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This supports the results of previous studies suggesting that the implementation of the
programme has had no consequences for households’ emigration decisions (Escobar Latapí &
González de la Rocha, 2012).
With regard to other controls, being a male-headed household is associated with having fewer
emigrants (p < 0.01). Households headed by respondents who are married or employed also have
fewer members living abroad. Although the number of emigrants per household is not signiﬁ-
cantly related to the age of the household head, households headed by young individuals have a
larger number of emigrants (p < 0.01) than other households. The number of emigrants per
household becomes larger as the number of household residents (p < 0.01) increases. There is also
a negative association between the number of emigrant members per household and the level of
education of the household head, and household’s aﬃliation to the Prospera programme
(p < 0.10), which is consistent with previous research (Fernández-Huertas, 2011; Stecklov,
Winters, Stampini, & Davis, 2005). Finally, households located in rural areas have a larger number
of outmigrants (p < 0.01), while those located in urban areas have fewer migrant members
(p < 0.01).
Column 2 shows that SP has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of
international return migrants per household (p < 0.01). This conﬁrms that this programme
increases the incentives for members of migrant households to return to Mexico.
As for other control variables, male-headed households have on average a larger number of return
migrants (p < 0.01). Although the age of the household head is not signiﬁcantly associated with the
number of returnees per household, cohort eﬀects show that households headed by individuals aged
between 32 and 47 years have a larger number of returnees (p < 0.10). There is also a positive
association between the level of education of the household head and the number of return migrants
per household.8 Households with married and employed heads have fewer return migrants
(p < 0.01). Likewise, the number of the latter is lower among those households that are beneﬁciaries
of the Prospera programme (p < 0.01). That said the households situated in rural localities do have a
larger number of returnees (p < 0.05). Also, and as expected, the number of return migrants per
Table 3. Determinants of Seguro Popular’s expansion by municipality and state. OLS regressions with a single control variable.
Municipal level State level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Single control variable 2006 2009 2014 2006 2009 2014
A. International emigrants per HH 0.001 0.012* 0.014 −0.029 0.022 0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.086) (0.066) (0.046)
Municipal- and state-level controls No No No No No No
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations (N) 2,329 2,329 2,325 32 32 32
B. International return migrants per HH −0.131 −0.192 −0.125 −0.611 −0.795 −1.160
(0.161) (0.163) (0.211) (2.536) (1.993) (1.162)
Municipal- and state-level controls No No No No No No
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations (N) 2,329 2,329 2,325 32 32 32
C. Share of HH that receive remittances −0.075 −0.038 0.890 −1.330 0.906 −0.304
(0.253) (0.257) (0.667) (3.961) (3.272) (2.125)
Municipal- and state-level controls No No No No No No
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations (N) 2,329 2,329 2,325 32 32 32
*p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Table presents regressions where the dependent variable is the proportion of eligible individuals covered by
SP at the municipal level (columns 1–3) and the state level (columns 4–6) in 2006, 2009 and 2014. Regressions do
not include municipal- and state-level interactions. Explanatory variables are drawn from Mexico’s 2000 Census of
Population and Housing. HH denotes household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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household is positively associated with the number of members who emigrated in the past 5 years
(p < 0.01). Finally, the number of return migrants per household is not meaningfully related to the
number of available medical facilities and to the homicide rate per 10,000 habitants.
Overall, results show that enrolment in SP does not aﬀect the number of international
emigrants per household – but is positively related to the number of return migrants therein.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
As a robustness check, we examine whether the impact of SP on outmigration and return
migration varies when using diﬀerent criteria for SP eligibility. In Panel A of Table 5, SP eligible
households are those headed by individuals working in the informal sector, whereas in Panel B, SP
eligible households are those with no members working in the formal sector. Results do not diﬀer
from those reported above and hold even when using diﬀerent eligibility criteria for SP. That is,
Table 4. The impact of Seguro Popular on international migration.
(1) (2)
Variable Emigrants Return migrants
SP coverage rate at the state level −0.0034 0.0207***
(0.0698) (0.0069)
Male −0.0696*** 0.0169***
(0.0105) (0.0027)
Age/100 −0.0308 −0.0042
(0.0326) (0.0079)
Elementary education 0.0099* 0.0017*
(0.0054) (0.0008)
Secondary education −0.0007 0.0054***
(0.0044) (0.0014)
High school education −0.0038 0.0082***
(0.0048) (0.0018)
Undergraduate and graduate education −0.0143** 0.0078***
(0.0053) (0.0024)
Married 0.0406*** −0.0050***
(0.0063) (0.0008)
Employed −0.0666*** −0.0067***
(0.0084) (0.0016)
Number of HH residents 0.0035*** −0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0003)
Other HH residents in labour force 0.0091*** 0.0027***
(0.0023) (0.0009)
HH aﬃliated to Prospera −0.0082 −0.0072***
(0.0049) (0.0016)
Number of international emigrants in HH – 0.0502***
(0.0040)
Medical facilities per 10,000 inhabitants −0.0004 0.0001
(0.0021) (0.0001)
Homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants −0.0011 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0001)
Rural locality 0.0429*** 0.0028**
(0.0087) (0.0011)
Highly urbanised locality −0.0376*** −0.0034*
(0.0076) (0.0018)
Cohort eﬀects Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations (N) 125,814 125,811
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from ENADID, SIMBAD and Policía Federal
(2015). SP coverage rate at the state level calculated based on the number of individuals who
are eligible to enrol in the programme. HH denotes household. Standard errors clustered at
the state level.
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SP is not a strong predictor of the number of outmigrants per household; yet, it has a positive and
strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of return migrants per household (p < 0.01). We also see
in Columns 3 and 4 (in Table 5) that, among ineligible households, SP is not a strong predictor of
the number of emigrants and return migrants.
We also investigated whether our results were robust to omitted-variable bias. To do this, we
used the method developed by Oster (2017), which examines whether coeﬃcients and R-squared
values shift after including additional controls. This is done by estimating bounding values for
both the treatment eﬀect and the bias-adjusted coeﬃcient. Under certain assumptions, we could
compute an approximation of the bias-adjusted treatment eﬀect as follows:
β  ~β δ
_β ~β
 
Rmax  ~R
 
~R _R  (3)
where δ represents the relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved variables – that is,
the explanatory power of the unobserved variables as a share of the explanatory power of the
observed variables . β denotes either the bias-adjusted coeﬃcient or the treatment eﬀect; _β
captures the baseline eﬀect and is the coeﬃcient resulting from the regression that includes the
treatment variable as a control (in this case, the SP coverage rate at the state-level), with _R being
the corresponding R-squared. ~β captures the controlled eﬀect and is the coeﬃcient of the
regression that includes the treatment variable and the set of all other relevant observed controls,
with ~R being the R-squared from that regression. Rmax is the R-squared of a hypothetical
regression that includes the treatment variable and the set of all other relevant observed and
unobserved controls. If the outcome is entirely explained by the treatment and the full set of
controls, then Rmax= 1.
Since both δ and Rmax have bounding values, we could estimate an identiﬁed set for the
treatment eﬀect. Following Oster (2017), equal selection (i.e. δ ¼ 1) is a proper upper bound on δ.
This implies that the eﬀect of the unobservables on the outcome variable has the same magnitude
as the inﬂuence of the observables. For Rmax, they suggest using a value of Rmax ¼ 1:3~R.9 Using the
elements presented in the standard regression tables, we then calculate Equation (3). The result of
this equation is a close approximation of the consistent unrestricted estimator (Oster, 2017).10
Table 5. Diﬀerent measures of Seguro Popular household eligibility.
Eligible Ineligible
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emigrants Return migrants Emigrants Return migrants
A: Eligibility based on household head
SP coverage rate state level −0.0034 0.0207*** 0.0377 0.0072
(0.0698) (0.0068) (0.0248) (0.0045)
Observations (N) 125,814 125,811 150,994 150,990
B: Eligibility based on any household member
SP coverage rate state level 0.0026 0.0212*** 0.0373 0.0048
(0.0634) (0.0065) (0.0223) (0.0052)
Observations (N) 147,117 147,144 129,691 129,687
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from ENADID, SIMBAD and Policía Federal (2015). (A): if household
head has social insurance, household is assumed ineligible for SP. (B): if any household member has social insurance,
household is assumed ineligible for SP. Control variables are the same as those included in Table 4. Standard errors
clustered at the state level.
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Table 6 presents the identiﬁed set [~β; β Rmax ¼ 1:3~R; δ ¼ 1
 
] for the eﬀects of SP on the
number of outmigrants per household, on the one hand, and the number of return migrants per
household, on the other. With regard to the programme’s eﬀect on the number of emigrants per
household, we could see that the identiﬁed set [−0.0034, 0.0426] includes zero; which conﬁrms
that the above results on SP having no eﬀect on households’ outmigration decisions are robust to
omitted-variable bias. As for the programme’s eﬀect on the number of return migrants per
household, the identiﬁed set [0.0207, 0.0235] only includes positive values. This suggests that
the ﬁnding on SP having a positive impact on the number of return migrants per household is
robust to omitted-variable bias.
Additionally, we examine whether the eﬀects of SP on household’s international migration
patterns vary across diﬀerent subsamples of the population. As seen in Table 7, the programme
has no eﬀect on the number of emigrants per household. This result holds true even after splitting
the sample into a series of population groups. To corroborate the above results on the eﬀects of SP
on return migration, we re-ran the analysis after splitting the sample into subgroups (Panels A-G).
As seen, SP only aﬀects the number of return migrants in households where the head is low-
skilled or lacks a college degree (p < 0.01) (Panel A), and in those households headed by males
(p < 0.01) (Panel B). The eﬀects of SP on return migration do not vary according to whether the
household is enrolled in Prospera or not (Panel C). However, the impact of this programme on
the number of return migrants holds for those households situated in both urban (p < 0.05) and
rural localities (0.10) (Panel D), households located in states with strong international migration
networks (p < 0.01) (Panel E),11 and households with no internal migrants (p < 0.10) (Panel F).
Thus, we could argue that SP aﬀects the incentives of migrant members to return home only for
households with certain characteristics. As for the impacts of this programme overtime, Panel G
shows that the eﬀects of the programme are slightly smaller, but still signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) even
after restricting the analysis to the period 1997 to 2009 (during which time the programme still
had not achieved full coverage across Mexican territory).12
Overall, we can conclude that SP has no consequences on the number of uninsured household’s
members abroad but has a positive eﬀect on the number of returnees therein, and that these ﬁndings
are robust across eligibility criteria, subsamples and time periods, and to omitted-variable bias.
6. Discussion of results
This study has explored whether the international migration patterns of Mexican uninsured
households can be attributed to the making available of the Seguro Popular programme. Based
on data from the ENADID, the analysis conﬁrms that the number of international emigrants per
Table 6. Sensitivity of the eﬀects of Seguro Popular on migration to omitted variable bias.
(1) (2)
Description Emigrants Return migrants
Baseline eﬀect ( _β) −0.1213*** 0.0120***
(0.0204) (0.0024)
R-squared ( _R) 0.012 0.001
Controlled eﬀect (~β) −0.0034 0.0207***
(0.0698) (0.0068)
R-squared (~R) 0.053 0.032
Identiﬁed set [~β; β Rm ¼ 1:3~R; δ ¼ 1
 
] [−0.0034, 0.0426] [0.0207, 0.0235]
Identiﬁed set includes zero? Yes No
*p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from ENADID, SIMBAD and Policía Federal
(2015) and econometric method developed by Oster (2017). Eﬀects denote the coeﬃcient of
the SP coverage rate at the state-level. Baseline eﬀect estimated using SP coverage rate at the
state-level as the only control variable. Controlled eﬀect estimated using the same control
variables as those included in Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the state-level.
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household is not statistically related to household aﬃliation to SP. This result contradicts the
predictions derived from the NELM. However, it is in-line with the previous research showing
that SP has no eﬀects on the probability of impoverished uninsured households choosing to send
migrants abroad (Escobar Latapí & González de la Rocha, 2012), or on that of households
receiving ﬁnancial remittances from abroad (Orraca-Romano, 2015). If international migration
has long been a social protection tool for uninsured Mexican households, the key question
becomes: Why has SP been ineﬀective in curbing outmigration from the country?
One possible reason is that this scheme is insuﬃcient to cover the healthcare needs of those
aﬃliated to it fully. Although the coverage of the programme has expanded across time and space,
levels of government spending on healthcare per capita are still lower for SP beneﬁciaries than
they are for those aﬃliated to other social security institutions in Mexico. Moreover, public
spending on healthcare infrastructure and personnel has remained unchanged overtime in the
country (CNN México, 2012b; Fuentes, 2014). In fact, most states and municipalities in Mexico
still lack qualiﬁed medical staﬀ (Posma, 2014). Of course, the quality of public healthcare remains
Table 7. Impact of Seguro Popular on international migration: Subsamples.
Sample (1) (2)
Emigrants Return migrants
A. High-skilled–Low-skilled
High-skilled (N = 9,136) −0.0392 −0.0066
(0.0294) (0.0203)
Low-skilled (N = 116,675) −0.0022 0.0223***
(0.0745) (0.0080)
B. Male–Female
Male (N = 99,052) −0.0181 0.0237***
(0.0760) (0.0074)
Female (N = 26,759) 0.0379 0.0095
(0.0735) (0.0133)
C. Household enrolled in Prospera
Yes (N = 28,620) 0.0679 0.0255*
(0.0652) (0.0139)
No (N = 97,191) −0.0135 0.0177**
(0.0816) (0.0076)
D. Urban–Rural
Urban (N = 76,240) 0.0118 0.0194**
(0.0414) (0.0081)
Rural (N = 49,571) −0.0209 0.0191*
(0.1199) (0.0108)
E. State networks
High (N = 42,482) −0.2404 0.0360***
(0.1387) (0.0100)
Medium (N = 34,888) 0.0370 0.0358
(0.0771) (0.0262)
Low (N = 48,442) 0.0159 0.0086
(0.0357) (0.0091)
F. Without internal migrants (N = 121,158) −0.0083 0.0158*
(0.0696) (0.0079)
G. 1997–2009 (N = 85,000) −0.0001 0.0149**
(0.0831) (0.0060)
Individual-level controls Yes Yes
Municipal-level controls Yes Yes
Cohort eﬀects Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from ENADID, SIMBAD and Policía Federal
(2015). Coeﬃcients refer to the SP coverage rate at the state level. Control variables are the
same as those included in Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
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lower in rural areas than in urban localities and complaints about the low quality of the healthcare
services provided through SP are common (Ortuño, 2015).
All of this suggests that aﬃliation to this programme does not guarantee free, eﬀective and
timely access to healthcare to the uninsured. As such, SP is unlikely to inﬂuence Mexican
households’ incentives to send members abroad. This could also explain why migrant households
that are aﬃliated to SP still use international remittances to cover their healthcare expenses
(Valero-Gil, 2009; Ochoa Lupián & Ayvar Campos, 2015; González-Block et al., 2013, p. 461).
In eﬀect, despite SP having been in place for more than a decade now, Mexico continues to be the
country with the highest levels of out-of-pocket spending on healthcare and the lowest levels of
public spending of all of the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) (Méndez Méndez, 2016; OECD, 2015).13 If the quality of the health-
care services provided continues to be dismal, universal healthcare programmes like SP will
remain ineﬀective means of reducing international outmigration in sending countries.
Furthermore, various studies demonstrate that the initial allocation (and the spatial distribu-
tion) of the SP programme had been uncorrelated to economic development levels, healthcare
needs, the size of the informal sector or average salaries in selected states and municipalities
(Aterido et al., 2010; Azuara & Marinescu, 2013; Barros, 2009; Bosch & Campos-Vásquez, 2014;
Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2006). But, these studies do show that the implementation of
the SP is highly vulnerable to discretionary management and political manipulation.14 Hence, it is
very likely that SP is not targeting the neediest households and communities, whose members
continue to have incentives to emigrate. To date, irregularities in the allocation of SP beneﬁts have
been cited in 30 of the country’s 32 federal states.15 These biases might owe to the centralised
structure of state revenues in Mexico, where federal funds are allocated to municipalities only
provided that the state legislatures give their prior approval. However, states and municipalities
that belong to the same political party frequently collude in the distribution of central government
beneﬁts.16
Overall, evidence from Mexico’s SP suggests that extending healthcare insurance to the
uninsured does not necessarily decrease international outmigration. As argued above, this ﬁnding
might be inﬂuenced by the speciﬁcities of the programme in question (including its design,
management and quality of service) (Hagen-Zanker & Himmelstine, 2013). However, it is also
possible that the outmigration incentives of Mexican uninsured households are driven by other
incentives related to the characteristics of the informal sector rather than to their lack of access to
public healthcare. From this viewpoint, international migration from Mexico is driven by the low
wages, low-status jobs, temporary positions and poor working conditions that are characteristic of
the country’s informal sector. This is consistent with previous research showing that members of
households headed by informal workers are more likely to emigrate than formal ones are (Sana &
Hu, 2006). Villarreal & Blanchard, 2013). Hence, neoclassical theories of international migration
can provide a better explanation than the NELM about the incentives of Mexican households to
send members abroad (Todaro, 1969).17
On the other hand, the evidence that has been presented here shows that the number of
international return migrants per household is positively related to the latter’s enrolment in the
SP. Although this ﬁnding holds only for a particular set of households, this might rather be related
to the vulnerable healthcare situation that many Mexican migrants face in the USA, where half of
all Mexican migrants are undocumented (Zong & Batalova, 2016) and lack access to the social
protection beneﬁts provided by the US government. Mexican immigrants also tend to have low-
wage jobs or work in the informal economy. Therefore, they cannot aﬀord health insurance
purchased from the US market, and consequently have limited access to health services.18 As of
2014, for instance, 47% of Mexican immigrants in the USA were uninsured (Zong & Batalova,
2016). In this context, many Mexican immigrants have strong incentives to return to their country
of origin for medical treatment when faced with a major health crisis.19 Their return intentions
should be stronger now that they are entitled to access free healthcare in their native country and
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can register to SP from abroad. Seen in this way, the incentives for many Mexicans to return are
driven by the extent to which migrants abroad can access healthcare in the USA, but also by the
expansion of health services for the uninsured within their home country.20
Of course, this study has various limitations. To begin with, the ENADID, the survey which
our analysis is based on, captures a relatively small sample of the population. Likewise, this survey
only considers those households having at least one member living in Mexico, therefore, we are
unable to include Mexicans families that are entirely composed by outmigrants or returnees
(McKenzie & Rapoport, 2010, p. 814). This attenuation bias resulting from measurement error
could explain why SP was not a signiﬁcant predictor of the number of outmigrants per household
in our analysis. While the 1997 edition of the ENADID survey allows the municipality in which a
household is in to be identiﬁed, this cannot be done in the subsequent editions. Consequently, the
coverage rate of SP was only introduced as a control variable at the state level and not the
municipal one. None of the editions of the ENADID survey was conducted around the period of
the programme’s introduction and initial expansion. The lack of longitudinal data restricts our
capacity to control for time-invariant unobserved factors aﬀecting migratory patterns at the
household level. And, the ENADID does not include information on household members’ reasons
for emigrating or for returning either. Thus, future studies should validate the results obtained
herein with alternative data and estimation strategies.
Further research could extend this analysis by considering other types of social protection
interventions, such as access to unemployment beneﬁts for the uninsured or non-contributory
pensions. Scholars could also examine whether the propositions of this study hold true across
other sending countries worldwide, ones where international migration has long been an eﬀective
way to improve the welfare of the uninsured and where universal healthcare programmes are in
place. These future undertakings will allow us to better understand the impact of welfare provision
on international migration in Mexico and beyond.
Notes
1. As of 2015, 58% of Mexico’s economically active population worked in the informal sector (Migueles, 2016).
2. In practice, however, very few families pay this premium.
3. As of 2002, two out of every three Mexican pesos (MXN) spent on public healthcare had been allocated to
social security institutions (Junco, 2015).
4. The 2006 ENADID survey data were collected by Mexico’s National Public Health Institute in cooperation
with the Ministry of Health, the National Population Council and INEGI.
5. A similar analysis is performed by Azuara and Marinescu (2013) as well as by Bosch and Campos-Vásquez
(2014), who all examine whether SP aﬀects participation rates in the informal sector, and by Orraca-Romano
(2015), who examines the eﬀects of the programme on domestic and international private cash transfers.
6. The regressions were estimated for all municipalities in which it was possible to construct all of the control
variables.
7. Although the average number of international emigrants per household in 2000 (i.e. before the SP was
implemented) is correlated with the SP’s municipal coverage rate in 2009, this relationship is weakly
signiﬁcant and potentially spurious.
8. Campos-Vasquez & Lara (2012) ﬁnd evidence that the selection patterns in observable skills of return
migrants from the USA to Mexico changed overtime, going from positive selection in 1990 to negative
selection in 2010.
9. See Oster (2017), for further details.
10. The unrestricted estimator could be calculated using the Stata command psacalc. In our analysis, we obtain
similar results for the bias-adjusted treatment eﬀects and the identifying sets using Equation (3) and psacalc.
11. Following Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994), a state migration network can be measured as the
proportion of all individuals in a given federal state who are over 15 years old and who have migration
experience to the USA.
12. We also ran the analysis with consideration of those households that have social security, and who are,
therefore, ineligible to enrol in the SP. As expected, within this group SP coverage has no eﬀect on the
number of emigrants or return migrants per household.
13. As of 2015, out-of-pocket spending on healthcare amounted to 45% of total health spending (OECD, 2015).
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14. For instance, Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2006) demonstrate that SP ﬁrst achieved universal coverage in the smallest
states of the country, so that the incumbent presidential party could beneﬁt from the expansion of this
programme in the 2006 presidential elections. By way of contrast, they show that the expansion of SP was
slower in the states ruled by the PRD – whose candidate was one of the main contenders in the presidential
race that year. Similar ﬁndings are attained by Bosch and Campos-Vásquez (2014), who show that the
programme’s expansion had been correlated with the party aﬃliation of governors and municipal mayors.
15. These anomalies include a lack of monitoring or evaluation of the programme results, no transparency in
the allocation of funds, no reliable registry of the people enrolled, premium charges for people who qualify
as poor, exemptions for families who do not even qualify as poor and the diversion of funds (Ángel, 2017a;
Bosch et al., 2012; CNN México, 2012c; Escobar Latapí & González de la Rocha, 2012).
16. A case in point is that of the former governor of the state of Veracruz, Javier Duarte, who has recently been
accused of diverting 2.3 million MXN from SP funds for private purposes (Ángel, 2017b; Raphael, 2007).
17. Neoclassical economics assume that international migration is motivated by wage diﬀerentials among
countries. In this approach, migrants are seen as individuals who maximize their earnings.
18. Following estimates by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), most Mexican immigrants in the USA have
lower education levels, lower incomes and, therefore, are more likely to experience poverty than the total
foreign- and native-born populations (Zong & Batalova, 2016).
19. It should be noted that the Mexican government oﬀers healthcare services to Mexican emigrants at its
consulates throughout the USA and at the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME). Additionally, in some states
of the USA like California, Mexican undocumented migrants do have access to healthcare. Nonetheless,
these options are by no means comprehensive healthcare programmes.
20. Between 2007 and 2014, the number of Mexican undocumented immigrants living in the USA declined by
more than 1 million (González Barrera & Krogstad, 2017, March 2).
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